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Shakespeare the Renaissance Humanist: Moral Philosophy and His Plays.
Anthony Raspa.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. x þ 196 pp. $95.
Anthony Raspa interprets several of Shakespeare’s plays in light of English writings and
translations by contemporaneous moral philosophers whose ideas, he claims, were
suﬃciently popular to constitute a kind of “street humanism” (1). Raspa’s thesis,
presented in chapter 1, is that Shakespeare drew on these ideas in ways that were self-
explanatory to his contemporaries, but that are diﬃcult for us to discern today because
our thought is guided by a diﬀerent set of metaphysical assumptions. This diﬃculty is
exacerbated by critical representations of Renaissance humanism as the early modern
equivalent of “modern materialist humanism” (16–17). To correct this misperception,
Raspa turns to such ﬁgures as William Baldwin, Pierre de La Primaudaye, Pierre
Charron, Philippe de Mornay, William Fulbecke, George Hakewill, Thomas Wright,
and Stephen Batman, whose edition of John of Trevisa’s translation of Bartholomaeus
Anglicus’s Proprietatibus Rerum was “Shakespeare’s encyclopedia,” according to J€urgen
Sch€afer (33). Raspa is right to insist that his book is not a mere exercise in “source-
hunting” (116). His comparisons of Shakespeare and the humanists work in both
directions, as evidenced in an insightful discussion of three diﬀerent conceptions of faith
expressed by Titus, Aaron, and Lucius in Titus Andronicus (24–27).
In chapter 2, Raspa contrasts the way modern conceptions of evolution permeate
Terrence Malick’s ﬁlm The Tree of Life with the way Renaissance conceptions of form
and soul govern the speech and action of King John and Hamlet. When King John
discerns the form of his deceased elder brother in Philip the Bastard, he isn’t simply
describing Philip’s physiognomy or genetic inheritance; rather, or in addition, he is
drawing on a thicker, more metaphysical conception of form that the Renaissance
humanists derived from Aristotle and Aquinas. The speciﬁc sense of form as political
“consensus” is gradually revealed in the play to be the antithesis to the “commodity” that
Philip both rails against and courts (38–39). Raspa detects a similar opposition between
representations of form/soul and dust in Hamlet.
Chapter 3, on King Lear, discusses Lear’s invocation of Apollo, the god on whose
temple, as the humanists noted, was adorned the phrase “Know Thy Selfe” (55).
Both Lear and Gloucester are represented as classically tragic characters whose
hamartia is self-ignorance. Raspa relates their ﬁgurative and literal blindness—and
eventual painful insight—to humanistic debates about the virtues and/or vices of
eyes. Eschewing pessimistic interpretations of the play, he argues that in it
Shakespeare shows that evil is conﬁned to human actions over which we have
control. Edmund’s ﬁnal act of repentance illustrates Charron’s idea that all humans
have a natural disposition toward goodness (75). In chapter 4, Raspa argues that
Macbeth’s hamartia is not his ambition but his tendency to let his will be guided by
his imagination rather than by his reason. He compares Macbeth to Hamlet, who like
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Banquo fears the ﬁgments of his own imagination, and to Orsino, who knows that his
image of Olivia is in part a product of his fancy. He also compares the witches’
temptation of Macbeth to Satan’s temptation of Eve in Paradise Lost, noting that
everything the witches prophesy is preﬁgured in Macbeth’s imagination, the locus of
the play’s dramatic unities.
Raspa’s commitment to ﬁnding hamartias in Shakespeare’s tragedies drives his
reading of Romeo and Juliet in chapter 5. When Romeo ﬁrst sees Juliet he realizes that his
previous attraction to Rosaline had been purely physical. The two lovers’ spiritual
“communion” (103) ultimately serves as an instrument of “divine justice” (106), but
they are unable to confront the worldly forces of fate and fortune that seemingly conspire
against them. Various views about the human capacity or incapacity to resist these forces
are voiced by Celia and Rosalind in As You Like It, and by Stefano, Ariel, and Prospero in
The Tempest. In his ﬁnal chapter, Raspa represents Ariel, Prospero, and Caliban as
personiﬁcations, respectively, of spirit, reason, and body. Less familiarly, he closes with
a lovely suggestion about Miranda’s “wonderment” at the “brave new world” she has just
discovered. It exempliﬁes “the wisdom that Charron recommends to the explorer”: the
insight that every newly discovered world is “a book of wisdom to another world yet
undiscovered” (136–37).
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